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The Strife of Riley: The Search-Incident 
Consequences of Making an Easy Case Simple 
Leslie A. Shoebotham* 
ABSTRACT 
In Riley v. California, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment requires police officers to obtain a warrant before 
searching an arrestee’s cellular phone in a search incident to a lawful 
arrest. The lauded decision heralds the modernization of the Fourth 
Amendment to embrace privacy in the digital age. But Riley’s 
reasoning contains a flaw that only Justice Alito recognized. Evidence 
gathering—i.e., the need to look for evidence of the arrestee’s crime 
for use at trial—has long justified law enforcement’s authority to 
perform incident searches. Indeed, evidence-gathering searches 
incident to arrest were recognized as legitimate searches over a 
century before the adoption of the Fourth Amendment. The Riley 
Court ignored this pedigree, however. Despite the doctrine’s 
centuries-long history, Riley concluded that the authority to search 
incident to arrest was defined by a trilogy of cases—California v. 
Chimel, United States v. Robinson, and Arizona v. Gant—cases that 
date back only to 1969. Based on the Chimel line, Riley concluded that 
the justifications for performing an incident search were limited to 
officer safety and preventing the destruction of evidence. And the only 
evidence-gathering incident search that Riley recognized was based 
on Gant; an incident search of the passenger compartment of an 
arrestee’s vehicle that Riley justified solely on the “unique 
circumstances” involved in the automobile context, not the search-
incident doctrine’s historical evidence-gathering basis. Therein lies 
the concern. By ignoring the doctrine’s evidence-gathering history, 
Riley has reorganized the search-incident doctrine into a rigid 
Chimel-based rule that just so happens to have a vehicle exception.  
This Article amplifies Justice Alito’s admonition that evidence 
gathering must be recognized as a legitimate justification for police to 
search incident to arrest. This Article addresses the consequences of 
Riley’s digital-age reboot of the search-incident doctrine, 
especially Riley’s limitation of Gant to the vehicle context—a 
restriction that was, ironically enough, not necessary for imposing 
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a warrant requirement on cell phone searches. Rather than relying 
solely on Chimel’s two “concerns,” this Article argues that the 
search-incident doctrine has been supported—both before and 
after Chimel—by three justifications: officer safety, preservation of 
evidence, and importantly, the need to discover evidence of the 
crime of arrest. Without evidence gathering as an implicit 
justification in a properly limited search incident to arrest, Riley’s 
limitation of Gant calls into doubt law enforcement’s authority to 
perform an incident search of an arrestee’s reaching distance—a 
Chimel search—to look for evidence of the arrestee’s crime once 
the arrestee has been handcuffed and is adequately secured. All 
things considered, Riley represents much more than a common-
sense warrant requirement for cell phone searches. Riley is the 
deceptively simple beginning of the end of evidence gathering as a 
justification in a properly limited search incident to arrest. 
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Lurking behind this issue [of warrantless searches of cell 
phones incident to arrest] is the question whether and when a 
laptop or desktop computer, [or] tablet . . . can be searched 
without a warrant—for a modern cell phone is a computer.1 
Americans love their gadgets. As technology has made 
electronic devices more portable, Americans increasingly carry 
with them devices that provide access to their most private 
information, both financial and personal.2 That people carry 
cellular phones is a self-evident truth. Advances in technology 
have meant that modern cell phones do much more than make 
phone calls, however. So-called “smart phones,” such as Droid, 
Galaxy, and iPhone, provide advanced computing capabilities to 
their users, including Internet access.3 The storage capability of 
such devices is vast.4 Built-in apps and downloadable third-party 
apps allow people to perform a myriad of tasks—everything from 
playing Angry Birds5 to accessing live video of the interior of their 
                                                                                                             
 1. United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 804 (2012). 
 2. Cf. City of Ontario, California v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010) (“Cell 
phone and text message communications are so pervasive that some persons 
may consider them to be essential means or necessary instruments for self-
expression, even self-identification.”). 
 3. PCMag.com’s online encyclopedia defines a smart phone as:  
A cellular telephone with built-in applications and Internet access. In 
addition to digital voice service, modern smartphones provide text 
messaging, e-mail, Web browsing, still and video cameras, MP3 player 
and video playback and calling. In addition to their built-in functions, 
smartphones run myriad free and paid applications, turning the once 
single-minded cellphone into a mobile personal computer.  
Definition of: Smartphone, PCMAG.COM, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia 
/term/51537/smartphone, archived at http://perma.cc/FAT5-DA34 (last visited 
Sept. 7, 2014). 
 4. Apple’s iPhone 5, for example, comes with up to 64 gigabytes of storage. 
See Tech Specs, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/iphone-5s/specs/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/7EMD-AZ72 (last visited Sept. 7, 2014). This device’s storage 
capacity is equivalent to about “four million pages of Microsoft Word 
documents.” See Charles E. MacLean, But, Your Honor, a Cell Phone is Not a 
Cigarette Pack: An Immodest Call for a Return to the Chimel Justifications for 
Cell Phone Memory Searches Incident to Lawful Arrest, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 38, 
42 (2012) (“A cell phone with just one gigabyte of memory can store over 64,000 
pages of Microsoft Word text, or over 100,000 pages of e-mails, or over 675,000 
pages of text files.”).  
 5. Rovio Entm’t Ltd., Angry Birds, APPLE, https://itunes.apple.com/us/app 
/angry-birds/id343200656?mt=8, archived at http://perma.cc/Q6MM-5YA8 (last 
visited Sept. 7, 2014) (describing strategy of game as: “The survival of the 
Angry Birds is at stake. Dish out revenge on the greedy pigs who stole their 
eggs”). 




homes.6 As the United States First Circuit Court of Appeals 
observed in United States v. Wurie: “In short, individuals today 
store much more personal information on their cell phones than 
could ever fit in a wallet, address book, briefcase, or any of the 
other traditional containers . . . .”7 Although password protection of 
cell phones and portable electronic devices provides some measure 
of protection for the phone or device’s stored data, that protection is 
technological, not constitutional.8 Without protection from the United 
States Supreme Court, an incident search of even a password-protected 
cellular phone was likely already technologically feasible for law 
enforcement to perform.9 
Against this backdrop, prior to Riley v. California10 most courts 
ignored the privacy implications of cell phone searches and, 
                                                                                                             
 6. SKJM, LLC, iCam – Webcam Video Streaming, APPLE, https://itunes 
.apple.com/us/app/icam-webcam-video-streaming/id296273730?m t=8, archived 
at http://perma.cc/BD9T-TYNM (last visited Sept. 7, 2014). In United States v. 
Flores-Lopez, Judge Posner, writing for a panel of the Seventh Circuit, used this 
particular downloadable app to illustrate how intrusive a warrantless cell phone 
search could be—by providing police with the functional equivalent to physical 
entry into the cell phone owner’s home. See 670 F.3d 803, 806 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(“At the touch of a button a cell phone search becomes a house search . . . .”). 
 7. United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2013), aff’d, Riley v. 
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
 8. See generally Adam M. Gershowitz, Password Protected? Can a 
Password Save Your Cell Phone From a Search Incident to Arrest?, 96 IOWA L. 
REV. 1125, 1174 (2011) (discussing password protection issues under Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments, and concluding that “[a]s a legal matter, password 
protecting the phone provides virtually no additional protection against police 
searches of cell phones incident to arrest”).  
 9. See, e.g., What is XRY?, MICRO SYSTEMATION, http://www.msab.com 
/xry/what-is-xry, archived at http://perma.cc/VD64-MFUV (last visited Sept. 7, 
2014) (“XRY is a software application designed to run on the Windows 
operating system which allows you to perform a secure forensic extraction of 
data from a wide variety of mobile devices, such as smartphones, gps navigation 
units, 3G modems, portable music players and the latest tablet processors such 
as the iPad.”); XRY Field Version, MICRO SYSTEMATION, http://www.msa 
b.com/xry/field-version, archived at http://perma.cc/9FJB-NLC6 (last visited 
Sept. 7, 2014) (“The Field Versions [of the XRY program] incorporate . . . 
hardware and software combined to perform a complete and rapid analysis for 
the vast majority of mobile devices available today.”).  
 10. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). Riley involved two cases that were consolidated 
for the Court’s consideration because both raised the question of “whether the 
police may, without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone seized 
from an individual who has been arrested.” Id. at 2480. Compare Wurie, 728 
F.3d at 13 (articulating categorical rule prohibiting cell phone searches incident 
to arrest), with People v. Riley, No. D059840, 2013 WL 475242 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Feb. 8, 2013) (upholding incident search of defendant’s cellular phone because 
phone was found on his person in search incident to arrest), rev’d and remanded 
by Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473.  




instead, relied on the Court’s bright-line search-incident rules to 
uphold warrantless searches of arrestees’ cellular phones.11 Based 
on these courts’ interpretations of the search-incident doctrine, 
police were entitled to peruse high-privacy electronic devices like 
cellular phones, regardless of the phone owner’s crime of arrest. 
Therefore, police treated the arrestee’s cellular phone as simply 
another “container” that could be “opened”—scrolled through—
during a search incident to arrest, in the same way that 
conventional containers, like pill bottles, were routinely opened.12 
In Riley, the Court was called upon to address a split that had 
arisen between courts that imposed a categorical warrant 
requirement on incident searches of cellular phones and courts that 
supported a bright-line rule permitting warrantless cell phone 
searches if the phone was found on the arrestee’s person in a 
search incident to arrest.13  
Riley established a bright-line rule prohibiting warrantless cell 
phone searches in all but exigent circumstances,14 eschewing an 
approach that would have allowed courts to determine the 
admissibility of cell phone data by performing a case-specific 
                                                                                                             
 11. See, e.g., Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d at 803–10 (upholding warrantless cell 
phone search incident to defendant’s arrest for drug trafficking because search 
of phone—which was limited to obtaining phone’s own telephone number—was 
minimally intrusive and the need to preserve phone’s evidence could not be 
completely ruled out); United States v. Curtis, 635 F.3d 704, 711–13 (5th Cir. 
2011) (upholding warrantless incident search of phone on which arrestee was 
talking when police stopped his vehicle); Silvan W. v. Briggs, 309 F. App’x 
216, 225 (10th Cir. 2009) (upholding warrantless incident search of cellular 
phone found on arrestee’s person); United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 411–
12 (4th Cir. 2009) (rejecting defendant’s argument that warrantless incident 
searches of cellular phones be limited to phones that have “small storage 
capacity”). 
 12. Cf. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (acknowledging that a “mechanical 
application” of United States v. Robinson’s bright-line search-incident rule 
“might well support the warrantless [cell phone] searches at issue here”); see 
also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).  
 13. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480; see also supra note 10. Although Riley 
considered the validity of warrantless cell phone searches, some lower courts 
upheld warrantless incident searches of other portable electronic devices 
including digital cameras, laptop computers, iPods, and tablets—if the device 
was found on the arrestee’s person in a search incident to arrest. See generally In 
re Alfredo C., No. B225715, 2011 WL 4582325, at *1–3 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 
2011) (upholding incident search of digital camera found on arrestee’s person in 
search incident to arrest).  
 14. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485, 2487 (holding that “officers must generally 
secure a warrant before conducting [a cell phone] search” but could rely on 
exigent circumstances to immediately search an arrestee’s phone if police were 
“truly confronted with a now or never situation” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  




balancing of interests.15 Riley was a rare unanimous decision in 
which the Court—in an opinion authored by the Chief Justice—
seemed to mirror society’s distaste for the intrusive police 
practice.16 The Riley Court framed its analysis of warrantless cell 
phone searches on three cases that Riley characterized as the 
search-incident doctrine’s “trilogy”17: Chimel v. California,18 
United States v. Robinson,19 and Arizona v. Gant.20 In reaching its 
common sense warrant requirement for cell phone searches, Riley 
might seem to have simply reaffirmed the alternative holdings in 
Gant—the third of Riley’s trilogy cases—both Gant’s holding that 
strictly limited law enforcement’s authority to conduct warrantless 
vehicle searches incident to arrest and the holding that approved an 
evidence-gathering search of an arrestee’s vehicle incident to 
arrest.21 This Article argues that Riley did much more, however, 
limiting Gant in ways that conflict with the search-incident 
doctrine’s historical basis. Although Riley’s categorical protection 
of cell phone data has been applauded,22 the Riley Court’s view of 
the search-incident doctrine will produce critically important 
consequences outside the cell phone context and, additionally, 
suggests a reorganization of the search-incident doctrine more 
generally.  
Importantly, Riley’s limitation of Gant was unnecessary to the 
Court’s quite sensible conclusion that police must obtain a warrant 
                                                                                                             
 15. Id. at 2491 (noting the Court’s “general preference to provide clear 
guidance to law enforcement through categorical rules”). 
 16. See id. at 2494–95 (“Modern cell phones are not just another 
technological convenience. With all they contain and all they may reveal, they 
hold for many Americans ‘the privacies of life.’” (quoting Boyd v. United States, 
116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886))). 
 17. Id. at 2484. 
 18. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
 19. 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
 20. 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
 21. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (citing Gant, 556 U.S. at 343). 
 22. See, e.g., Editorial, The Court Saves Cellphone Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 26, 2014, at A26, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/26/opinion 
/the-supreme-court-saves-cellphone-privacy.html, archived at http://perma.cc/6R 
YA-PE6F (“Still, [the Riley Court’s] ruling reaffirmed the essence of the Fourth 
Amendment’s ban on unreasonable searches and seizures . . . even though the 
Bill of Rights was written by men who could not have imagined an iPhone in 
their maddest dreams.”); Opinion, Smart Phones and the Fourth Amendment, 
WALL ST. J. (June 26, 2014), http://online.wsj.com?articles/smart-phones-and-
the-fourth-amendment-1403738424#livefyre-comment, archived at http://perma. 
cc/J9BJ-KJ2N (describing the Riley Court’s “wise[]” decision to require a 
warrant to search arrestee’s cellular phone as recognizing the “truth” and 
observing that “[l]iberals often claim the Constitution must change to 
accommodate a new era, though the genius of the document is that its core 
protections are abiding and universal”).  




to search an arrestee’s cellular phone.23 Riley’s warrant 
requirement for cell phone searches was fully supported by Riley’s 
treatment of cellular phones as a special “category of effects”24—a 
search that was different from traditional incident searches 
because, from a practical perspective, a cell phone search could not 
be limited to law enforcement’s perusal of cell phone data related 
to the arrest scene or even to the crime of arrest itself.25 Instead, 
Riley’s gratuitous limitation of Gant—concluding that evidence-
gathering incident searches were permissible only for arrestees’ 
vehicles26—likely portends a modern reorganization of the search-
incident doctrine. Without evidence gathering as an implicit 
justification in a properly limited search incident to arrest, Riley’s 
limitation of Gant calls into doubt law enforcement’s authority to 
perform an incident search of an arrestee’s reaching distance—a 
Chimel search—to look for evidence of the arrestee’s crime once 
the arrestee has been handcuffed and is adequately secured.  
Rather than relying solely on Chimel’s two “concerns,”27 this 
Article argues that the search-incident doctrine has been 
supported—both before and after Chimel—by three justifications: 
officer safety, preservation of evidence, and importantly, the need 
to discover evidence of the crime of arrest. And, according to 
Justice Alito—who concurred in Riley to make the evidence-
gathering argument—nothing in the past 100 years, including 
Chimel and its progeny cases, has eliminated the evidence-
                                                                                                             
 23. Cf. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485; see supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 24. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484–85; see infra notes 52–54 and 
accompanying text.  
 25. See generally Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485 (determining legitimacy of 
warrantless cell phone searches by asking “whether application of the search 
incident to arrest doctrine to this particular category of effects would untether 
the rule from the justifications underlying the Chimel exception” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). The Riley Court additionally found it important that 
technology presently exists that allows law enforcement to easily prevent the 
loss of cell phone data while awaiting a warrant to search an arrestee’s phone. 
See id. at 2487; see infra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 26. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2492 (rejecting government’s argument that “the 
Gant standard be imported from the vehicle context” because “Gant relied on 
circumstances unique to the vehicle context to endorse a search solely for the 
purpose of gathering evidence” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). Chief Justice Roberts’s desire to limit Gant should come as a surprise 
to no one. Chief Justice Roberts, who wrote the Court’s opinion in Riley, also 
joined Justice Alito’s cogent dissent in Gant. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 
364 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s approach in Gant 
“leaves the law relating to searches incident to arrest in a confused and unstable 
state”); see infra notes 182–185 and accompanying text. 
 27. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485 (“We first consider each Chimel concern in 
turn.”).  




gathering rationale as justifying a properly limited incident 
search.28 If Chimel, Robinson, and Gant are the search-incident 
doctrine’s “trilogy,”29 then Justice Alito’s Riley concurrence makes 
clear that he was unwilling to ignore the doctrine’s prequel—
search-incident cases that upheld as reasonable law enforcement’s 
authority to search for evidence of the crime of arrest within the 
areas permitted in a properly limited search incident to arrest.30 
In Part I, this Article considers the Riley decision’s analytical 
framework, including the narrow universe of search-incident cases 
that Riley deemed applicable in determining the cell phone cases 
and, additionally, Riley’s refusal to consider evidence gathering as 
a legitimate justification to search in a properly limited incident 
search. Part II traces the evolution of incident searches, first as a 
warrantless evidence-gathering search that turned on the search’s 
reasonableness, then through the search’s reorientation to a warrant 
exception justified by arrest-related exigency in Chimel and the 
cases that generalized Chimel, and more recently Gant, where a 
hybrid evidence-gathering incident search of vehicles was 
recognized. Additionally, Part II posits that although Chimel and 
its progeny were intended to provide clear boundaries on incident 
searches—i.e., the arrestee’s reaching distance—to use in training 
law enforcement officers in the field, these cases did not eliminate 
law enforcement’s authority to perform an evidence-gathering 
search within the areas permitted in a properly limited search 
incident to arrest. Part III considers the consequences of Riley’s 
reconfiguration of Gant, including the potential doctrinal 
instability that Riley’s retcon search-incident rule will produce and 
Riley’s likely impact on law enforcement’s authority to perform an 
incident search of an arrestee’s reaching distance once arrest-
related exigency no longer exists because the arrestee has been 
handcuffed and is adequately secured. Part IV concludes. 
I. RILEY V. CALIFORNIA: THE SAVIOR OF CELL PHONE PRIVACY 
As the text makes clear, the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth 
Amendment is “reasonableness.” Our cases have determined 
that where a search is undertaken by law enforcement officials 
to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing, . . . 
reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a judicial 
warrant. . . . In the absence of a warrant, a search is 
                                                                                                             
 28. See id. at 2496 (Alito, J., concurring); see infra notes 69–71 and 
accompanying text.  
 29. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (majority opinion). 
 30. See id. at 2495–96 (Alito, J., concurring); see infra notes 69–71. 




reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the 
warrant requirement.31 
Center stage in Riley’s consideration of warrantless cell phone 
searches is the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement.32 Although the search-incident 
doctrine has existed for centuries, Riley decided the cell phone search 
cases based on three search-incident cases that date back only to 
196933: Chimel v. California,34 United States v. Robinson,35 and 
Arizona v. Gant.36 In Chimel, the Court articulated generalized rules to 
establish the scope of incident searches, justifying this warrant 
exception on the exigency arising from arrest itself: (1) safety—the 
need to disarm the arrestee and remove weapons from the arrestee’s 
immediate control, and (2) preservation of evidence—preventing the 
concealment or destruction of evidence.37 Chimel represented an 
important reorientation of the search-incident doctrine—a doctrine 
that, prior to Chimel, had been based on the need to gather evidence 
from the arrestee and the area of the arrestee’s possession for use at 
trial.38 But the pre-Chimel search-incident doctrine had proven almost 
impossible to apply because of differing views regarding how broadly 
law enforcement could search the arrestee’s environment in an 
evidence-gathering search incident to arrest.39 Chimel therefore limited 
a search incident to arrest to the person of the arrestee and the area 
“within his immediate control”40—the arrestee’s reaching distance—
based on the exigency arising from arrest, and in doing so, placed 
critically important outer boundaries on the scope of incident 
searches.  
                                                                                                             
 31. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482 (majority opinion) (first ellipsis in original) 
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).  
 32. See id. (“The two [cell phone] cases before us concern the 
reasonableness of a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.”). The Fourth 
Amendment guarantees that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .” 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 33. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 34. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
 35. 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
 36. 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
 37. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763. 
 38. See infra notes 87–89 and accompanying text. 
 39. See, e.g., Chimel, 395 U.S. at 755 (observing that “[t]he decisions of this 
Court bearing upon [the search-incident-to-arrest exception] have been far from 
consistent, as even the most cursory review makes evident”); see infra notes 87–
99 and accompanying text. 
 40. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763. See infra text accompanying note 119.  




In applying Chimel, the Riley Court was quick to dismiss that 
the first of Chimel’s concerns—officer safety—could be furthered 
by warrantless cell phone searches.41 As Riley explained, once an 
arrestee’s phone has been seized and secured, “data on the phone 
can endanger no one.”42 Chimel’s second concern—preventing the 
destruction of evidence—required a broader discussion involving 
cell phone technology: remote wiping of cell phone data and data 
encryption.43 Remote wiping occurs when a phone receives a 
signal from another location, perhaps sent by a third party, that 
erases the cellular phone’s stored data.44 Data encryption, on the 
other hand, is a security feature that protects a cell phone’s stored 
data from anyone who does not know the phone’s password.45 
Riley dismissed the government’s remote wiping and data 
encryption arguments with a two-pronged analysis: diminish and 
distinguish. 
First, Riley diminished the factual basis for the government’s 
preservation-of-evidence argument, stating that the Court had 
“been given little reason to believe that either problem [of remote 
wiping of cell phone data and data encryption was] prevalent.”46 
Second, Riley distinguished Chimel—which the Riley Court 
explained had focused exclusively on the actions of the arrestee—
not on concerns that a third party might attempt to destroy 
evidence.47 And perhaps most importantly, Riley explained that if 
                                                                                                             
 41. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014) (majority 
opinion). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See id. at 2486. 
 44. See id. Prior to Riley, one of the primary legal issues that courts wrestled 
with in the cell phone cases concerned whether the information stored on an 
arrestee’s cellular phone remained sufficiently “destructible,” despite the 
phone’s seizure, that the search-incident doctrine supported a warrantless search 
of the phone’s electronic contents. Some courts concluded that data stored on an 
arrestee’s cellular phone was “destructible,” within the meaning of Chimel, 
because cell phone data could be lost through a “remote wipe”—a function that 
is available through most cell phone service providers or by purchasing a 
downloadable app—which removes data from the device after it is in a third party’s 
hands. See, e.g., Definition of: Remote Wipe, PCMAG.COM, http://www.pcmag.com 
/encyclopedia/term/66274/remote-wipe, archived at http://perma.cc/9N3Q-GL4V 
(last visited Sept. 7, 2014) (“Using the Internet to establish the connections, the 
primary purpose of a remote wipe is to remove private data from a stolen smartphone, 
tablet or laptop computer. It may also delete apps and the OS [operating system], 
rendering the device useless.”); see generally United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 
803, 807–09 (7th Cir. 2012) (discussing remote wiping of cell phone data).  
 45. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2486. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. (“[T]hese broader concerns about the loss of evidence [from remote 
wiping of cell phone data and data encryption] are distinct from Chimel’s focus 




police were concerned that a third party might attempt to remotely 
wipe an arrestee’s cellular phone, law enforcement could take 
preventative steps short of searching the phone by placing it in a 
“Faraday bag”—an inexpensive, lightweight aluminum bag that 
isolates the phone from electronic signals that would otherwise 
delete the phone’s stored data.48  
Riley also distinguished United States v. Robinson, a search-
incident decision that applied Chimel’s twin rationales to the 
“search of the contents of an item found on an arrestee’s person.”49 
Robinson upheld the arresting officer’s authority to search a 
cigarette package—in which contraband was discovered—that the 
officer found in Robinson’s coat pocket in a search incident to his 
arrest for driving with a revoked license.50 As Riley explained, the 
Robinson Court concluded that the cigarette-pack search was 
reasonable—even though the arresting officer was not specifically 
concerned that Robinson might attempt to destroy evidence or that 
Robinson was armed—because Chimel’s two risks “are present in 
all custodial arrests” involving incident searches of “physical 
objects.”51  
But Riley declined to apply Robinson to incident searches of 
cellular phones despite acknowledging that a “mechanical 
application” of Robinson “might well support” warrantless cell 
phone searches.52 Riley explained that Robinson’s bright-line 
conclusion that “physical objects” always present some danger to 
law enforcement and a risk that evidence might be destroyed was 
distinguishable from cellular phones—a “category of effects” that 
                                                                                                             
 
on a defendant who responds to arrest by trying to conceal or destroy evidence 
within his reach.”). 
 48. See id. at 2487 (observing that Faraday bags are “essentially sandwich 
bags made of aluminum foil: cheap, lightweight, and easy to use”). 
 49. Id. at 2488 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)). 
 50. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 220, 223. 
 51. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2483–85 (citing Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236) 
(explaining that Robinson “did not draw a line between a search of Robinson’s 
person and a further examination of the cigarette pack found during that 
search”). Riley noted, however, that the Court “clarified” Robinson’s bright-line 
rule in a later case by limiting this search exception to “personal property . . . 
immediately associated with the person of the arrestee,” which the Court in 
United States v. Chadwick concluded did not include a “200-pound, locked 
footlocker” that law enforcement had seized from the arrestees’ control and 
stored at a different location. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977)). 
 52. See id. at 2484 (2014); see supra note 12. 




do not implicate either of Chimel’s concerns.53 Although Riley 
distinguished Robinson’s bright-line rule based on the “context of the 
physical objects,” subsequent language revealed that Riley was more 
concerned with the phone’s contents—which Riley described as 
encompassing “vast quantities of personal [digital] information.”54  
Finally, Riley also dispatched Arizona v. Gant,55 the third of the 
Court’s so-called “trilogy” cases.56 As Riley explained, Gant’s two 
holdings limited the availability of a Chimel-based search of an 
arrestee’s vehicle and, additionally, recognized “an independent 
exception” for the warrantless search of a vehicle’s passenger 
compartment “when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to 
the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”57 Gant’s 
evidence-gathering search, Riley explained, “stems not from 
Chimel . . . but from ‘circumstances unique to the vehicle 
context’”;58 “unique circumstances” that Riley described as “a 
reduced expectation of privacy and heightened law enforcement 
needs when it comes to motor vehicles.”59 Because cell phone 
searches “bear neither of those characteristics,” Riley distinguished 
Gant’s evidence-gathering search of an arrestee’s vehicle from 
warrantless cell phone searches.60 Finding that the search-incident 
trilogy—Chimel, Robinson, and Gant—did not control the 
question of warrantless cell phone searches, Riley held “that 
                                                                                                             
 53. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484–85. Riley rejected the government’s 
argument that cell phone data was searchable if police could have obtained the 
information from “a pre-digital counterpart” because both the volume of data 
stored on a phone and the “range of items” stored thereon made it unlikely that 
people could carry “such a variety of information in physical form.” Id. at 2493.  
 54. See id. at 2485, 2490 (“Although the data stored on a cell phone is 
distinguished from physical records by quantity alone, certain types of data are 
also qualitatively different.”). 
 55. 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
 56. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484.  
 57. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Gant, 556 U.S. at 
343). 
 58. See id. (quoting Gant, 556 U.S. at 343). 
 59. Id. at 2492 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Gant, 556 U.S. at 
343) (“Justice Scalia’s Thornton opinion, on which Gant was based, explained 
that those unique circumstances are ‘a reduced expectation of privacy’ and 
‘heightened law enforcement needs’ when it comes to motor vehicles.” (quoting 
Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 631 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring))). 
 60. See id. Riley additionally distinguished Gant’s evidence-gathering 
search because it would have provided no practical limitation on warrantless cell 
phone searches. See id. (“It would be a particularly inexperienced or 
unimaginative law enforcement officer who could not come up with several 
reasons to suppose evidence of just about any crime could be found on a cell 
phone.”). 




officers must generally secure a warrant before conducting [a cell 
phone] search.”61 
Importantly, Riley’s discussion of Gant did more than simply 
distinguish between incident searches of vehicles and incident 
searches of cellular phones. Riley placed Gant’s two warrantless 
searches into separate warrant-exception categories, implicitly 
redefining Gant’s evidence-gathering search—from a search that was 
based on the search-incident doctrine’s historical evidence-gathering 
justification62 to, instead, an elaboration on the automobile 
exception.63 Even accepting as true Gant’s unsurprising comment that 
its evidence-gathering search did not “follow” from Chimel, it is 
another thing altogether to maintain, as Riley did, that Gant’s search 
did not arise from the search-incident doctrine.64 In so saying, Riley 
seemingly detached Gant’s evidence-gathering search from the search-
incident doctrine and recast that search as a reasonable suspicion-
based variant of the automobile exception.65  
II. THE SEARCH-INCIDENT-TO-ARREST DOCTRINE: AN ANCIENT 
RULE 
This right [to search for evidence of crime] has been 
uniformly maintained in many cases.66  
Is 100 years ancient? For the Riley Court, it apparently was.67 
Although Justice Alito concurred in the Riley judgment,68 he wrote 
                                                                                                             
 61. See id. at 2485; see supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 62. Cf. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2492; see supra notes 57–60 and accompanying 
text. Although the Gant majority distinguished between Gant’s two holdings—
explaining that Gant’s evidence-gathering search “d[id] not follow from 
Chimel”—Gant in no way suggested that its evidence-gathering holding was 
independent of, or had not arisen from, the search-incident doctrine. See Arizona 
v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009). Riley went further than Gant, however, 
limiting the availability of Gant’s evidence-gathering search to the “unique 
circumstances” involved in the vehicle search context. Cf. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 
2492.  
 63. The automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement authorizes law enforcement to perform a warrantless probable cause 
based search of a vehicle due to the vehicle’s mobility and because the pervasive 
regulation of vehicles has reduced society’s reasonable expectation of privacy in 
vehicles. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985). 
 64. Cf. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484–86, 2492 (discussing and treating Gant’s 
evidence-gathering search as an “independent exception” from the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement, suggesting thereby that the warrant 
exception for Gant’s evidence-gathering search was not derived from search-
incident doctrine). 
 65. See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text. 
 66. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). 




separately to emphasize that it was a “mistake” for the Court to 
determine the legitimacy of warrantless cell phone searches based 
solely on Chimel and its progeny.69 Justice Alito argued that the 
Riley Court erred in ignoring the “ancient rule” of the search-
incident doctrine—a rule that “antedates the adoption of the Fourth 
Amendment by at least a century,”70 and for which the Court 
previously concluded that the adoption of “the Fourth Amendment 
did not disturb this [ancient] rule.”71  
Yet, the Court in Riley substantially trimmed the exception’s 
history—and, therefore, pedigree—writing that “the existence of 
the [search-incident-to-arrest] exception . . . has been recognized 
for a century, [and] its scope has been debated for nearly as 
long.”72 In fact, not only is the search-incident doctrine much older 
than the Riley Court admitted, but Riley additionally failed to 
acknowledge the doctrine’s historical basis—the need to discover 
evidence for use at the arrestee’s trial.73 Commentators have 
confirmed that the authority to search an arrestee has existed since 
                                                                                                             
 
 67. Compare Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482 (majority opinion) and infra text 
accompanying note 72, with Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495 (Alito, J., concurring) and 
infra note 69–71 and accompanying text. 
 68. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495 (Alito, J., concurring) (agreeing with the Riley 
Court’s conclusion that the Fourth Amendment did not support warrantless 
incident searches of arrestees’ cellular phones). 
 69. See id. at 2495–96 (arguing that pre-Chimel cases did not support the 
Riley Court’s view that search-incident doctrine “was based exclusively or 
primarily” on officer safety and preventing the destruction of evidence). 
 70. Id. (disagreeing with the Riley Court’s reliance on Chimel because 
“Chimel’s reasoning is questionable” and, additionally, disagreeing with Riley’s 
approach of ignoring pre-Chimel cases which had applied the “ancient” search-
incident rule). Further, Justice Alito observed that relying solely on Chimel’s 
justifications was not logically consistent with how the Court had applied the 
search-incident doctrine in other contexts: 
What ultimately convinces me that the rule is not closely linked to the 
need for officer safety and evidence preservation is that these rationales 
fail to explain the rule’s well-recognized scope. It has long been 
accepted that written items found on the person of an arrestee may be 
examined and used at trial. But once these items are taken away from 
an arrestee (something that obviously must be done before the items are 
read), there is no risk that the arrestee will destroy them. Nor is there 
any risk that leaving these items unread will endanger the arresting 
officers. 
Id. at 2496. 
 71. See id. at 2495 (citing Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392). 
 72. Id. at 2482 (majority opinion). 
 73. Cf. id. at 2483–85 (limiting analysis of cell phone question to Chimel 
and Chimel-based search-incident cases).  




at least the seventeenth century.74 Importantly, searches incident to 
arrest were routinely justified by the need to obtain evidence for 
use at trial and were rarely the subject of constitutional challenge.75  
In discussing the search-incident doctrine’s evidence-gathering 
justification, Judge Cardozo observed that a “dearth of illustrative 
precedent both in our own country and abroad” supported searches 
of legally arrested persons to look for evidence of crime.76 
Treatises written in the nineteenth century likewise assumed that 
evidence gathering was a legitimate reason to search incident to 
arrest—to discover evidence for use at the arrestee’s trial.77Indeed, 
a lawful arrest authorized the arresting officer to search and seize 
property that could afford: 
[E]vidence of the crime charged, or means of identifying 
the criminal, or may be helpful in making an escape. The 
officer has the undoubted right to make the search, and, 
considering the nature of the accusation, he may, when 
acting in good faith, take into his possession any articles he 
may suppose will aid in securing the conviction of the 
prisoner, or will prevent escape.78 
                                                                                                             
 74. Akhil R. Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
757, 764 (1994) (citing TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 28–29 (1969)) (describing Professor Telford Taylor’s “brilliant 
study of the Fourth Amendment” as reminding that “since at least the 
seventeenth century, the common law has recognized broad authority to search 
an arrestee and his immediate surroundings without a search warrant, and even 
when the arrest itself was warrantless”). 
 75. William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 
YALE L.J. 393, 401 (1995) (“Searches for bloody shirts, murder weapons, and 
stolen goods, as long as they were incident to arrest, remained legal, indeed 
unchallenged.”). 
 76. People v. Chiagles, 142 N.E. 583, 583–84 (N.Y. 1923) (“The books 
speak broadly of searching the person of the prisoner for anything that may be of 
use as evidence upon the trial . . . or for anything that will aid in securing the 
conviction . . . .” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 77. See e.g., F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 60, at 45 
(8th ed. 1880); J. BISHOP, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 210–12, at 127 (2d ed. 
1872). As Professor Bishop explained, the arresting officer was authorized to 
search: 
[T]he prisoner’s person, or [for items] otherwise in his possession, [to 
look for] either goods or moneys which there is reason to believe are 
connected with the supposed crime as its fruits, or as the instruments 
with which it was committed, or as directly furnishing evidence relating 
to the transaction, [and the arresting officer] may take the same, and 
hold them to be disposed of as the court may direct. 
BISHOP, supra.  
 78. Holker v. Hennessey, 42 S.W. 1090, 1093 (Mo. 1897). As the Montana 
Supreme Court explained, the “power” to conduct an evidence-gathering search 




 The long-standing acceptance of the search-incident doctrine, 
and the evidence-gathering assumptions that underlie it, were the 
likely reason that the Court was not called upon until 1914 in 
Weeks v. United States to consider the legitimacy of a search 
incident to arrest.79 And, as Justice Alito observed in his Riley 
concurrence, since the Weeks decision the Court has never 
eliminated evidence gathering as a legitimate basis to perform a 
properly limited search incident to a lawful arrest.80 
A. Evidence-Gathering Searches Incident to Arrest: The Search-
Incident Doctrine’s Original Rationale 
The Court’s first approval of a search incident to arrest appears 
in dictum in Weeks v. United States, where the Court explained 
that the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures was not implicated when police “search[ed] 
the person of the accused [when he or she had been] legally 
arrested, to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime,” 
because that search had “always [been] recognized under English 
and American law.”81 Weeks’s reference to the search of an 
arrestee’s person was thereafter expanded, first, to include the area 
“in [the arrestee’s] control,”82 and then later, to a search of “the 
place where the arrest is made.”83 The Court’s discussions evolved 
from dictum into law in 1927 in Marron v. United States,84 which 
                                                                                                             
 
at the time of a lawful arrest existed by virtue of the arresting officer’s “public 
duty,” which necessitated an immediate search following arrest because 
otherwise “all evidences of crime and of identification of the criminal might be 
destroyed before the prisoner could be taken before the magistrate.” Id. 
 79. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914); see supra text 
accompanying note 66.  
 80. Cf. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014) (Alito, J., 
concurring) (“And neither in Weeks nor in any of the authorities discussing the 
old common-law rule have I found any suggestion that [the search-incident 
doctrine] was based exclusively or primarily on the need to protect arresting 
officers or to prevent the destruction of evidence.”). 
 81. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 391–92. 
 82. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925).  
 83. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925). 
 84. 275 U.S. 192 (1927). In Marron, federal agents secured a search warrant 
to look for intoxicating liquors at a certain location, and while executing the 
search warrant, the agents arrested an individual whom they encountered on the 
premises for operating an illegal drinking establishment. Id. at 193–94. Based 
upon the authority of that arrest, the agents seized items not listed in the search 
warrant—including an incriminating ledger the agents found in a closet—in a 
search that Marron upheld because the ledger was “part of . . . [the] equipment 
actually used to commit the offense.” Id. at 194, 199. 




upheld as reasonable a premises search incident to the arrest of a 
person whom federal agents caught committing a crime when they 
arrived to execute a search warrant.85  
From 1927 until Chimel was decided in 1969, the Court 
struggled to reconcile competing lines of authority—with one line 
turning on the proper scope of a search incident to arrest, and the 
other on the triggering circumstances that would make the search 
available to law enforcement in the first place.86 Prior to Chimel, 
incident searches were assumed to be evidence-gathering 
searches—searches directed at uncovering evidence of the crime of 
arrest.87 The right to conduct an evidence-gathering search arose 
from the authority of a lawful arrest, leaving the Court to consider 
whether the incident search at issue was “reasonable”—a question 
that generally turned on the scope of the evidence-gathering 
search.88 To determine reasonableness, the Court considered each 
search’s “own facts and circumstances.”89 Under this potentially 
open-ended rationale, incident searches of entire homes or offices 
were upheld if the Court was satisfied that arresting officers were 
searching for evidence of the crime of arrest, not just rummaging 
through the arrestee’s things to see “whatever might be turned 
up.”90 If the Court concluded that officers were legitimately 
looking for evidence of the crime of arrest, expansive and 
extremely thorough premises searches incident to an occupant’s 
arrest were often permitted,91 based on the Court’s broad 
                                                                                                             
 85. Id. at 199 (upholding incident search of premises because “[the agents] 
had a right without a warrant contemporaneously to search the place in order to 
find and seize the things used to carry on the criminal enterprise”).  
 86. See infra notes 90–102 and accompanying text. 
 87. See, e.g., Marron, 275 U.S. at 198–99; Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 
41–42 (1963) (plurality opinion); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 235–41 
(1960); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 314 (1959); United States v. 
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 61–66 (1950), overruled by Chimel, 395 U.S. 752; 
Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 151, 155 (1947), overruled by Chimel, 
395 U.S. 752. 
 88. See, e.g., Marron, 275 U.S. at 198–99. 
 89. See, e.g., Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 
(1931) (“There is no formula for the determination of reasonableness.”). 
 90. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 61–62 (upholding incident search of arrestee’s 
one-room business office, including desk, safe, and file cabinets, over a period 
of one and one-half hours; search “was not general or exploratory” because 
officers were searching for evidence of crime of arrest—stamps with forged 
overprints). 
 91. Harris, 331 U.S. at 153 (upholding incident search of arrestee’s four-
room apartment over five-hour period to look for forged checks for which 
defendant had been arrested; “[t]he search was not a general exploration but was 
specifically directed to the means and instrumentalities by which the crimes 
charged had been committed”). 




interpretation of the areas within an arrestee’s “control” or 
“possession” that might conceal evidence of the crime of arrest.92  
The volatility of search-incident doctrine arose, however, 
because even “specific[]”93 searches—those in which law 
enforcement was looking for evidence of the crime of arrest—were 
sometimes struck down if the Court believed that it would have 
been “practicable” for the investigating officers to obtain a search 
warrant prior to their arrest of the premises’ occupant.94 In the 
practicability cases, the Court refused to limit its analysis to 
determining whether the incident search was reasonable in scope. 
Instead, the Court focused on whether proper triggering circumstances 
for the warrantless search were present—an analysis that turned on 
whether law enforcement could have obtained a search warrant, but 
failed to do so.95 Although the practicability approach advanced the 
goal of imposing a categorical warrant requirement,96 it did so only 
                                                                                                             
 92. Cf. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 760 (recounting expansive premises searches 
upheld under Rabinowitz).  
 93. See Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 62 (“Specificity was the mark of the search 
and seizure here.”), overruled by Chimel, 395 U.S. 752; see supra note 90. 
 94. See, e.g., Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705–10 (1948) 
(“[N]o reason whatever has been shown why the arresting officers could not 
have armed themselves during all the weeks of their surveillance of the locus 
with a duly obtained search warrant . . . .”), overruled by Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 
56, 65 (rejecting argument that search-warrant requirement should be 
“crystallized into a sine qua non to the reasonableness of a search”), overruled 
by Chimel, 395 U.S. 752.  
 95. See, e.g., Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346, 347 (1957) (per 
curiam) (rejecting warrantless incident search of entire cabin and seizure of 
cabin’s contents because agents had cabin under surveillance for twenty-four 
hours). 
 96. Cf. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“[O]ur jurisprudence lurched back and forth between imposing a 
categorical warrant requirement and looking to reasonableness alone. . . . By the 
late 1960’s, the preference for a warrant had won out, at least rhetorically.” 
(citations omitted)). Based upon a textual analysis of the Fourth Amendment, 
Professor Lloyd Weinreb described the warrant-requirement debate as follows:  
A thoughtful and strict grammarian might conclude from the structure 
of the amendment that the second clause is a partial explication of the 
first, so that any search conducted without a warrant is, by that fact 
alone, unreasonable. . . . Another grammarian might conclude that the 
first clause stated a condition for application of the second, so that there 
was a requirement that a search not be “unreasonable” independent of 
the particular requirements of the warrant clause. 
Lloyd L. Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 
47, 47–48 (1974). By the late 1960’s, the Court had settled on the warrant 
preference approach. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) 
(“[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by 
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—




marginally—in those cases where it was clear that police had been 
watching the suspect for some (undesignated, but nevertheless 
unreasonable) period of time. The practicability approach never 
fully won out, however, and additionally, injected new uncertainties 
into the Court’s search-incident-to-arrest determinations—by 
requiring consideration of whether exigent circumstances existed—
such as whether the arrestee was apprehended while committing a 
felony in the officer’s presence,97 or whether the situation 
otherwise called for quick action on the part of law enforcement.98 
Deciding which of these competing lines of cases would 
control in any given fact situation forced the Court to rely on hair-
splitting distinctions between the facts involved in the two lines.99 
The Court’s repeated vacillations—likely symptomatic of its 
conflicted view of the categorical warrant requirement itself100—
contributed to the schizophrenia of the Court’s search-incident 
caselaw101 and produced the jurisprudential pendulum swings for 
which the search-incident-to-arrest exception is so well known.102 
                                                                                                             
 
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 97. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 462–63 (1932), abrogated by 
Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).  
 98. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 42 (1963) (plurality opinion) (upholding 
premises search because defendant’s “furtive conduct” established that “time 
clearly was of the essence” in preventing loss of contraband).  
 99. See, e.g., Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. at 464–65 (distinguishing similar incident 
search to the one upheld in Marron because Marron involved seizure of 
materials used “to carry on the criminal enterprise,” but the incident search in 
Lefkowitz was an “exploratory and general” search “made solely to find 
evidence of respondents’ guilt”); Harris, 331 U.S. at 153 (distinguishing Go-
Bart Importing Co. and Lefkowitz because officers in Harris were specifically 
looking for canceled checks that were evidence of crimes charged), overruled by 
Chimel, 395 U.S. 752; Ker, 374 U.S. at 42 (distinguishing Trupiano because 
agents in Trupiano had been in possession of information sufficient to obtain 
search warrant for three weeks, while officers in Ker “had reason to act quickly” 
to prevent the likely loss of marijuana); see supra notes 87–99 and 
accompanying text. 
 100. See supra note 96. 
 101. Cf. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 67 (1950) (Black, J., 
dissenting) (“In recent years, the scope of the [search-incident-to-arrest] rule has 
been a subject of almost constant judicial controversy both in trial and appellate 
courts. In no other field has the law’s uncertainty been more clearly 
manifested.”), overruled by Chimel, 395 U.S. 752. 
 102. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 350 (2009) (recounting the 
“checkered history of the search-incident-to-arrest exception”). 




B. The Pendulum Swings in Chimel v. California 
It is argued in the present case that it is “reasonable” to 
search a man’s house when he is arrested in it. But that 
argument is founded on little more than a subjective view 
regarding the acceptability of certain sorts of police 
conduct, and not on consideration relevant to Fourth 
Amendment interests. Under such an unconfined analysis, 
Fourth Amendment protection in this area would approach 
the evaporation point.103 
After its decision in United States v. Rabinowitz,104 the Court’s 
preference for search warrants105—rather than determining the 
search’s “reasonableness” on a case-by-case basis—had become 
manifest, leading to the sea change that was Chimel.106 In Chimel, 
police went to Chimel’s home with a warrant for Chimel’s arrest 
for a coin-shop burglary.107 No search warrant for Chimel’s home 
had been obtained, however.108 Chimel’s wife allowed the officers 
to wait inside the house until Chimel returned from work.109 When 
Chimel entered the home, one of the officers handed him the arrest 
warrant and asked for permission to “look around.”110 Chimel 
refused but was told that, “on the basis of the lawful arrest,” 
officers were permitted to conduct such a search.111 What ensued 
was a search of the entire three-bedroom house—including the 
attic, garage, and a small workshop—that took between forty-five 
minutes and an hour.112 During that search, items were seized that 
                                                                                                             
 103. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764–65 (1969). 
 104. 339 U.S. 56 (1950), overruled by Chimel, 395 U.S. 752. See supra notes 
90, 93; cf. Weinreb, supra note 96, at 73 (“In the wake of Rabinowitz, some 
lower courts all but ignored the warrant clause whenever the police had made a 
related arrest.”). 
 105. See supra notes 96 and accompanying text. 
 106. Compare Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 65–66 (“The mandate of the Fourth 
Amendment is that the people shall be secure against unreasonable searches. . . . 
The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but 
whether the search was reasonable.”), with Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763 (“[Searches 
of areas beyond those justified by arrest-related exigency], in the absence of 
well-recognized exceptions, may be made only under the authority of a search 
warrant. The ‘adherence to judicial processes’ mandated by the Fourth 
Amendment requires no less.”).  
 107. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 755. Chimel accepted the California Supreme 
Court’s conclusion that Chimel’s arrest was valid “[w]ithout deciding the 
question.” Id.  
 108. Id. at 754. 
 109. Id. at 753. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 753–54. 
 112. Id. at 754. 




were introduced over Chimel’s objection at his trial on the burglary 
charges.113 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the 
constitutionality of the incident search of Chimel’s home, 
observing that the Court’s cases on this issue “have been far from 
consistent, as even the most cursory review makes evident.”114 
If the Chimel Court had been limited to its two prior lines of 
authority, yet another hair-splitting decision would have resulted—
the incident search in Chimel could have been analyzed under 
either of the Court’s two lines. Based on the Rabinowitz line, the 
officers’ search of Chimel’s entire house incident to his arrest was 
arguably reasonable.115 The officers were looking for coins and 
other small items that were stolen in the burglary of a coin shop, 
items that could easily have been hidden anywhere inside Chimel’s 
home. On the other hand, the officers’ failure to obtain a search 
warrant for Chimel’s home despite the fact that they apparently 
could have done so was potentially fatal under the practicability 
line.116 Rather than continue down either of those competing paths, 
the Chimel Court reoriented the search-incident doctrine away from 
reasonableness determinations—under which a search warrant was 
not constitutionally required117—to, instead, a warrant exception 
that was justified by the exigency arising from arrest itself: 
protection of officer safety and the need to preserve evidence.118 
In establishing the scope of an incident search based on arrest-
related exigency, Chimel explained: 
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting 
officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any 
weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist 
arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety 
might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In 
addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to 
search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person 
in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the 
area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a 
weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed 
by a like rule. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of 
                                                                                                             
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 755. 
 115. Id. at 766 (explaining that the Court could “draw a line” between the 
premises searches in Rabinowitz and Harris and the premises search in Chimel, 
although “such a distinction would be highly artificial”).  
 116. Cf. id. at 775 (White, J., dissenting) (“[T]here was surely probable cause 
on which a warrant could have issued to search the house for the stolen coins.”).  
 117. See supra notes 87–92 and accompanying text. 
 118. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763 (majority opinion). 




one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting 
officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person 
arrested. There is ample justification, therefore, for a 
search of the arrestee’s person and the area “within his 
immediate control”—construing that phrase to mean the 
area from within which he might gain possession of a 
weapon or destructible evidence.119 
By relying on officer safety and preservation-of-evidence 
concerns, Chimel both framed its analysis in terms of a warrant 
exception and laid to rest the long-contested scope issue for 
premises searches incident to arrest. Chimel overruled United 
States v. Rabinowitz120 and Harris v. United States,121 and in doing 
so, rejected those cases’ expansive view of the area within an 
arrestee’s control, which courts had come to view as the arrestee’s 
entire home.122 Importantly, however, Chimel never overruled 
those cases’ evidence-gathering rationale, just the expansive 
premises searches that the seemingly unconfinable evidence-
gathering basis had produced.123 Chimel was therefore directed at 
finding an endpoint for premises searches incident to arrest, as 
opposed to categorically rejecting Rabinowitz and Harris’s 
evidence-gathering rationale if the premises search was properly 
limited to the areas supported by arrest-related exigency.124 
In fact, even Chimel itself recognized law enforcement’s 
general interest in evidence gathering during searches incident to 
arrest—albeit limited to the areas justified by Chimel’s exigency 
rationale—language that is inconsistent with construing Chimel to 
                                                                                                             
 119. Id. at 762–63 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 120. 339 U.S. 56 (1950), overruled by Chimel, 395 U.S. 752. See supra note 
90. 
 121. 331 U.S. 145 (1947), overruled by Chimel, 395 U.S. 752. See supra note 
91. 
 122. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 768 (“It is time . . . to hold that on their own facts, 
and insofar as the principles they stand for are inconsistent with those that we 
have endorsed today, [Rabinowitz and Harris] are no longer to be followed.”). 
 123. Cf. id. at 766 (“No consideration relevant to the Fourth Amendment 
suggests any point of rational limitation, once the search is allowed to go beyond 
the area from which the person arrested might obtain weapons or evidentiary 
items.”); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 225–26 (1973) (explaining 
that Chimel “overruled Rabinowitz and Harris as to the area of permissible 
search incident to a lawful arrest” (emphasis added)). 
 124. Chimel’s focus on scope—rather than on Rabinowitz’s evidence-
gathering rationale—is reflected in Chimel’s observation that Rabinowitz’s 
expansive view of the area within an arrestee’s control was a doctrine that “at 
least in the broad sense in which it was applied by the California courts in this 
case, can withstand neither historical nor rational analysis.” See Chimel, 395 
U.S. at 760 (emphasis added).  




require the potential destruction of evidence as a precondition for a 
Chimel search. Although Chimel referenced “destructible evidence” in 
describing the scope of a properly limited premises search,125 Chimel’s 
holding also supported evidence gathering of the crime of arrest as an 
additional search-incident motivation. As the Chimel Court explained: 
“The search [in Chimel] went far beyond the petitioner’s person and 
the area from within which he might have obtained either a weapon or 
something that could have been used as evidence against him.”126 
Chimel’s use of language such as “gain[ing] possession”127 and 
“obtain[ing]” a weapon or evidentiary items128 is in no way 
inconsistent with an evidence-gathering basis to search incident to 
arrest. Chimel used those descriptions to establish its reaching-distance 
limitation129—an entirely separate question from what it is that an 
arrestee might lunge to “obtain.”130 Especially telling, in the early 
years after Chimel the Court harmonized Chimel with the search-
                                                                                                             
 125. See id. at 763; see supra text accompanying note 119.  
 126. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 768 (emphasis added).  
 127. Id. at 763. 
 128. Id. at 768. See supra text accompanying notes 119, 126. 
 129. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763 (1969) (including within scope of valid 
incident search “the area into which an arrestee might reach” (emphasis added)); 
see supra text accompanying note 119; Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 
635 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (characterizing Chimel as articulating 
“reaching-distance principle” in establishing scope of valid incident search); see 
also New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461 (1981) (describing Chimel as 
authorizing incident search of items “within an arrestee’s reach”), abrogated by 
Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011); cf. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 623 n.3 
(majority opinion) (explaining that Belton adopted “bright-line rule” concerning 
scope of vehicle search because determining whether item in vehicle’s passenger 
compartment was “within an arrestee’s reaching distance under Chimel” was 
“unworkable”).  
 130. Cf. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 768. The view that Chimel was based solely 
upon arrest-related exigency—the need to search for weapons and to prevent the 
loss of destructible evidence—was likely bolstered by the Court’s opinions that 
used this portion of Chimel’s rationale as a basis to distinguish Chimel from 
other warrantless searches. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968) 
(differentiating more-limited search permitted in frisk from search incident to 
arrest because frisk was “not justified by any need to prevent the disappearance 
or destruction of evidence of crime”); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 649 
(1983) (Marshall, J., concurring) (distinguishing inventory search from search 
incident to arrest, explaining that “[a] warrantless search incident to arrest must 
be justified by a need to remove weapons or prevent the destruction of 
evidence”). However, these cases’ comparisons to Chimel suggest no 
disapproval of Chimel’s treatment of evidence gathering as an additional 
motivation to perform a search incident to arrest (within Chimel limits). See 
supra notes 119–129 and accompanying text. And, importantly, these opinions 
are in no way inconsistent with the post-Chimel cases in which incident searches 
were supported, in part, by the need to gather evidence of the crime of arrest. 
See infra note 131 and accompanying text. 




incident doctrine’s evidence-gathering basis. As the Court’s early post-
Chimel cases reflect, evidence gathering of the crime of arrest 
remained a legitimate law enforcement rationale to search incident to 
arrest—so long as the scope of that search was limited to the areas 
designated in Chimel. 131 
Chimel was silent, however, on the issue of whether the now-
limited search was available even when the search’s justifications 
were not present. Therefore, after Chimel, even if arresting officers 
avoided searches that pushed Chimel’s exigency-based outer 
boundary (the arrestee’s reaching distance), the question remained 
whether authority to search incident to arrest would be generalized 
to all arrests, even those in which the arrestee was handcuffed and 
the scene was under the control of law enforcement. The Court 
granted certiorari to answer this question, at least as it pertained to 
the search of an arrestee’s person incident to arrest, just four years 
later in United States v. Robinson.132  
In Robinson, the defendant was lawfully arrested and taken into 
custody for driving with a revoked license.133 During a pat-down 
search, the arresting officer felt an object in Robinson’s coat 
pocket that the officer could not identify from its shape.134 The 
officer retrieved the object from Robinson’s pocket and found it to 
be a “crumpled up cigarette package,”135 which the officer opened 
and found heroin capsules inside. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed Robinson’s eventual 
conviction for possession of heroin, finding that the arresting 
officer lacked probable cause to believe that the cigarette package 
                                                                                                             
 131. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 482 (1971) (plurality 
opinion) (“We did not indicate [in Chimel] . . . that the police must obtain a 
warrant if they anticipate that they will find specific evidence during the course 
of [a search incident to arrest].”); Id. at 514 (White, J., concurring and 
dissenting) (arguing that while Chimel “narrowed the permissible scope of 
incident searches,” Chimel did not require law enforcement to obtain a warrant 
to “discover evidence of crime” within a “properly limited” search incident to 
arrest); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 292, 296 (1973) (upholding, as valid 
under Chimel, the warrantless taking of fingernail scrapings from murder-
suspect husband, even though husband was not arrested for wife’s murder until a 
month later); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 802 (1974) (explaining 
that warrant exception for incident searches “has traditionally been justified by 
the reasonableness of searching for weapons, instruments of escape, and 
evidence of crime” (emphasis added)); see also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 
565, 575–76 (1991) (“Under Belton, the same probable cause to believe that a 
container holds drugs will allow the police to arrest the person transporting the 
container and search it.”). 
 132. 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
 133. Id. at 220–21. 
 134. Id. at 223. 
 135. Id. (quoting arresting officer). 




contained a weapon or evidence of the crime of arrest—driving 
without a license.136 
The Supreme Court ultimately reversed the D.C. Circuit’s 
ruling, and in doing so, articulated the first of its generalized 
interpretations of Chimel. In Robinson, the Court authorized a 
search of the arrestee’s person incident to arrest in all cases, and 
additionally, refused to require a case-by-case determination of 
whether a basis to search the arrestee was present under Chimel’s 
twin rationales.137 As Robinson explained: 
The authority to search the person incident to a lawful 
custodial arrest, while based upon the need to disarm and to 
discover evidence, does not depend on what a court may 
later decide was the probability in a particular arrest 
situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found 
upon the person of the suspect.138  
With the authority to perform an incident search of the 
arrestee’s person generalized to all arrests in Robinson, most courts 
likewise assumed that police were authorized to perform a Chimel 
search of the arrestee’s reaching distance in every case even if the 
arrestee was handcuffed and adequately secured at the time of the 
search.139 However, Chimel proved especially problematic when 
                                                                                                             
 136. Id. at 227. 
 137. Id. at 235 (holding that an incident search of the arrestee’s person was 
both an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and was 
“also a ‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment”). 
 138. Id. Prior to the Court’s recent decision in Riley, some courts interpreted 
Robinson’s generalized authority to search an arrestee’s person incident to arrest 
to, additionally, support the warrantless search of the arrestee’s cellular phone 
if—like the cigarette package at issue in Robinson—the phone was found on the 
arrestee’s person. See, e.g., People v. Riley, No. D059840, 2013 WL 475242, at 
*6 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2013) (citing People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 505 (Cal. 
2011)) (upholding incident search of arrestee’s cellular phone because “[People 
v.] Diaz controls the present case, and the key question is whether Riley’s cell 
phone was ‘immediately associated’ with his ‘person’ when he was stopped”), 
rev’d and remanded by Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014); see also 
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484; see supra note 10. 
 139. See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 926 F.2d 883, 886–88 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(upholding incident search of bedroom in which arrestee was arrested, even 
though arrestee had been handcuffed and moved to a different room at time of 
search, because the bedroom that police searched had been within arrestee’s 
control when he was arrested and police acted reasonably in moving arrestee to 
a different room before searching); United States v. Lyons, 706 F.2d 321, 330 
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (acknowledging that determination of arrestee’s reaching 
distance “ha[d] not been interpreted rigidly” because arrests involve 
“dangerous,” rapidly unfolding circumstances; police “cannot be expected to 
make punctilious judgments regarding what is within and what is just beyond 
the arrestee’s grasp”). But see United States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 273 (3d 




the arrestee’s reaching distance included the passenger 
compartment of a vehicle.140 State and federal appellate courts 
divided on whether to apply the fact-specific Chimel analysis to 
incident searches of vehicles, or instead, a generalized rule like the 
one articulated in Robinson. Robinson’s reliance on a bright-line 
search-incident rule141 may have contributed to the Court’s 
willingness to craft additional generalized rules to govern vehicle 
searches incident to arrest.142  
The Court granted certiorari in New York v. Belton to resolve the 
then “widespread conflict” in the state and federal courts concerning 
whether police could search the passenger compartment of a vehicle 
incident to an arrest of the vehicle’s occupant.143 The arrestee in 
Belton was one of four men riding in a vehicle that was lawfully 
stopped for speeding.144 The lone investigating officer soon 
determined that probable cause existed to arrest the vehicle’s 
occupants for possession of marijuana.145 The officer instructed the 
men to exit the vehicle, patted them down, separated them from one 
another, and then proceeded to search the passenger compartment 
of the vehicle.146 The officer found cocaine in the zippered pocket 
of Belton’s jacket, which was located on the back seat of the car.147 
The New York Court of Appeals invalidated the incident search of 
                                                                                                             
 
Cir. 2002) (invalidating incident search of bag located approximately three feet 
from arrestee because arrestee was handcuffed with his hands behind his back, 
face-down, guarded by two officers, and the bag was zipped closed). 
 140. See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2424 (2011) (“This rule 
may be stated clearly enough, but in the early going after Chimel it proved 
difficult to apply, particularly in cases that involved searches inside of 
automobiles after the arrestees were no longer in them.” (internal quotation 
marks and brackets omitted)). 
 141. See Wayne R. LaFave, “Case-By-Case Adjudication” Versus “Standardized 
Procedures”: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 141 (“A highly 
sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts . . . may be 
the sort of heady stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers and judges 
eagerly feed, but they may be literally impossible of application by the officer in 
the field.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 142. Cf. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 620 (2004) (majority 
opinion) (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)) (explaining that the 
Belton Court had considered benefits of Robinson’s bright-line rule in arriving at 
generalized search-incident rules for vehicles).  
 143. Cf. id. at 633 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (recounting background giving 
rise to grant of certiorari in Belton). 
 144. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 455 (1981). 
 145. The officer smelled “burnt marihuana” upon approaching the vehicle 
and observed an envelope marked “Supergold” on the vehicle’s floorboard, 
which the officer associated with marijuana. Id. at 455–56. 
 146. Id. at 456. 
 147. Id. 




the vehicle, however, because at the time of the search the 
vehicle’s four occupants were under arrest and the vehicle and its 
contents were “safely within the exclusive custody and control of 
the police.”148 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 
because “courts ha[d] found no workable definition of the area 
within the immediate control of the arrestee when that area 
arguably includes the interior of an automobile.”149 
Rather than following Chimel’s fact-intensive determination of the 
area within the arrestee’s reaching distance, Belton articulated a 
generalized rule concerning the scope of a vehicle search incident to 
arrest—the vehicle’s entire passenger compartment.150 Belton 
supported its generalization that the vehicle’s entire passenger 
compartment was within an arrestee’s reaching distance by 
highlighting the need for a “straightforward,” “workable rule” that 
could be readily understood and administered by officers in the 
field.151 Belton additionally established generalized rules concerning 
“containers” uncovered during an incident search.152 As Belton 
explained: 
[P]olice may also examine the contents of any containers 
found within the passenger compartment, for if the 
passenger compartment is within reach of the arrestee, so 
also will containers in it be within his reach. Such a 
container may, of course, be searched whether it is open or 
closed, since the justification for the search is not that the 
arrestee has no privacy interest in the container, but that the 
lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any 
privacy interest the arrestee may have.153 
Belton described a “container” as “any object capable of 
holding another object,” which Belton then illustrated with a list of 
receptacles such as “luggage, boxes, bags, clothing, and the 
like.”154 Finally, Belton limited its broad, generalized authority to 
perform vehicle searches incident to arrest with an additional 
                                                                                                             
 148. People v. Belton, 407 N.E.2d 420, 423 (N.Y. 1980), rev’d, New York v. 
Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
 149. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 459–60 (“In order to establish the workable rule this category of 
cases requires, we read Chimel’s definition of the limits of the area that may be 
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 152. Id. at 460. 
 153. Id. at 460–61 (citations omitted). 
 154. Id. at 460 n.4. Belton further explained that “closed or open glove 
compartments, consoles, or other receptacles located anywhere within the 
passenger compartment” were “container[s]” for Belton purposes. Id.  




generalized rule—an incident search of an arrestee’s vehicle does 
not include the vehicle’s trunk.155 
Belton’s generalized rules were far less defensible than the 
common sense protections that Robinson provided to law 
enforcement, however.156 After Belton, police treated incident 
searches of vehicles as an “entitlement,”157 engaging in the practice 
even when there was no legitimate danger to officers or risk that 
evidence in the vehicle could be concealed or destroyed.158 Lower 
courts’ expansive interpretations of the already-generalized Belton 
rules did not go unnoticed. In Thornton v. United States, two 
members of the Court went out of their way to criticize this police 
practice while addressing another Belton issue that had plagued the 
lower courts159—the question of whether a vehicle search incident 
to arrest should be expanded to include the vehicle of an arrestee 
who was simply within reaching distance of his or her vehicle, but 
was not actually inside it, at the time the officer initiated contact.160 
Relying on Belton, the Court in Thornton adopted a “recent 
occupant” trigger, meaning that Thornton extended Belton’s 
generalized rules to allow a Belton search of an arrestee’s vehicle 
if the arrestee was a recent occupant who was near the vehicle at 
the time of arrest—rather than relying on Chimel’s fact-specific 
determination of the arrestee’s reaching distance.161  
                                                                                                             
 155. Id. (“Our holding encompasses only the interior of the passenger 
compartment of an automobile and does not encompass the trunk.”). 
 156. Cf. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973); see supra 
notes 137–38.  
 157. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 624 (2004) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
 158. See, e.g., United States v. Milton, 52 F.3d 78, 80 (4th Cir. 1995); United 
States v. Willis, 37 F.3d 313, 316–18 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. White, 
871 F.2d 41, 43–44 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. McCrady, 774 F.2d 868, 
871–72 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Cotton, 751 F.2d 1146, 1148–50 (10th 
Cir. 1985). 
 159. See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 624 (O’Connor, concurring) (criticizing 
police practice of conducting Belton search of vehicle after arrestee had been 
secured, which Justice O’Connor viewed as “a direct consequence of Belton’s 
shaky foundation”). Justice Scalia argued that the police practice of handcuffing 
an arrestee and securing him or her in the back of a squad car meant that “[i]f it 
was ever true that the passenger compartment is in fact generally, even if not 
inevitably, within the arrestee’s immediate control at the time of the search, it 
certainly is not true today.” See id. at 628 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
 160. See id. at 617–19 (majority opinion). 
 161. Id. at 623–24 (“So long as an arrestee is the sort of ‘recent occupant’ of 
a vehicle such as petitioner was here, officers may search that vehicle incident to 
the arrest.”). 




Thornton managed to cobble together a five-vote majority in 
favor of expanding Belton’s generalized search-incident rule, even 
though it was clear that most Justices on the Court believed that 
Belton had been pushed too far.162 Although Thornton did not 
overturn Belton, the writing was on the wall—or at least in Justice 
Scalia’s concurrence—that the broad interpretation of Belton’s 
already-generalized rule was vulnerable.163 There, Justice Scalia 
examined the search-incident doctrine as it had existed prior to 
Chimel.164 Justice Scalia argued that the pre-Chimel search-
incident doctrine clearly supported evidence gathering as a 
legitimate basis to search incident to arrest: 
There is nothing irrational about broader police authority to 
search for evidence when and where the perpetrator of a 
crime is lawfully arrested. The fact of prior lawful arrest 
distinguishes the arrestee from society at large, and 
distinguishes a search for evidence of his crime from 
general rummaging. Moreover, it is not illogical to assume 
that evidence of a crime is most likely to be found where 
the suspect was apprehended.165 
Rather than relying on Chimel’s generalized bases to search—
which authorized police to perform a Belton search of the 
arrestee’s vehicle in every case—Justice Scalia instead argued for a 
more privacy-protective approach that supported a Belton search 
only when a reasonable basis existed to believe that the arrestee’s 
vehicle contained evidence of the crime of arrest.166 According to 
Justice Scalia, “[i]f Belton searches are justifiable, it is not because 
the arrestee might grab a weapon or evidentiary item from his car, 
but simply because the car might contain evidence relevant to the 
crime for which he was arrested.”167  
                                                                                                             
 162. Justice O’Connor provided the crucial fifth vote in Thornton. Id. at 625 
(O’Connor, J., concurring).  
 163. See Leslie A. Shoebotham, The (Inevitably Arbitrary) Placement of 
Bright Lines: Belton and Its Progeny, 79 TUL. L. REV. 365, 394–99 (2004) 
(anticipating Gant’s adoption of evidence-gathering basis to justify incident 
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authorizing evidence-gathering search). 
 164. See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 629–32 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 165. Id. at 630.  
 166. See id.  
 167. Id. at 629.  




C. The Pendulum Swings Again: A Doctrine in Transition 
The criticisms voiced in Thornton set the stage for the Court’s 
reconsideration of search-incident doctrine in Arizona v. Gant.168 
There, officers who were already aware that Gant’s driver’s license 
had been suspended observed Gant pull into the driveway of a 
house being investigated as a drug house.169 Gant got out of his 
vehicle, shut the door, and approached the officers.170 The officers 
met Gant about ten to twelve feet from his vehicle, arrested him for 
the driver’s license violation, and placed him in handcuffs.171 Gant 
and two other individuals who had been arrested at the scene for 
other crimes were secured in three separate squad cars. The 
passenger compartment of Gant’s vehicle was then searched.172 
The officers found cocaine and a gun in Gant’s vehicle, which 
Gant sought to suppress because: (1) he had been secured at the 
time of the Belton search and therefore could not have accessed the 
passenger compartment of his vehicle, and (2) he had been arrested 
for a traffic violation for which no evidence could have been 
present in his vehicle.173 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 
explaining that “[t]he chorus that has called for us to revisit Belton 
includes courts, scholars, and Members of this Court who have 
questioned that decision’s clarity and its fidelity to Fourth 
Amendment principles.”174 
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, authored an opinion 
that clearly reflected the compromise required in obtaining Gant’s 
five majority-opinion votes. Gant set out two alternative holdings, 
one pertaining to Belton and the other authorizing the evidence-
gathering search (with important modifications) that Justice Scalia 
argued for in his Thornton concurrence.175 In the first of its 
alternative holdings, Gant rejected the broad, or generalized, view 
of the authority to perform a Belton search of a vehicle when the 
search was not supported by arrest-related exigency—those cases 
in which the arrestee was secured in the back of a squad car.176 
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 169. Id. at 335–36. 
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 174. Id. at 338. 
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Importantly, Gant did not overrule Belton, finding instead that in 
“the rare case” where “an officer is unable to fully effectuate an 
arrest so that a real possibility of access to the arrestee’s vehicle 
remains,” a Belton search is still available.177  
In its other holding, Gant pressed evidence gathering as the 
primary basis for a vehicle search incident to an arrest of the 
vehicle’s recent occupant, explaining that “[a]lthough it does not 
follow from Chimel, we also conclude that circumstances unique to 
the vehicle context justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when 
it is reasonable to believe that evidence relevant to the crime of 
arrest might be found in the vehicle.”178 Justice Scalia provided 
Gant’s crucial fifth vote in a concurrence that suggests Belton and 
Thornton could be on borrowed time.179 As Justice Scalia 
explained, the truth behind “Belton’s fanciful reliance upon officer 
safety” was a “return” to the evidence-gathering searches that were 
permitted prior to Chimel.180 The compromise nature of Gant’s 
majority opinion becomes fully apparent in Justice Scalia’s 
admission that he joined the majority only to avoid a “4–to–1–to–4 
opinion” that would “leave[] the governing rule uncertain.”181 
Justice Alito wrote a scathing dissent—in which three other 
Justices including the Chief Justice joined—which focused 
primarily on the majority’s de facto rejection of Belton and 
Thornton and the majority’s failure to justify its decision on stare 
decisis principles.182 Importantly, Justice Alito criticized the 
majority’s reconfiguration of Belton, from determining whether 
                                                                                                             
 177. Id. at 343 n.4. The Gant Court invalidated the incident search of Gant’s 
vehicle because law enforcement could not reasonably have believed that Gant 
could access his vehicle once he was handcuffed and secured in a squad car. Id. 
at 344.  
 178. Id. at 343 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Thornton, 541 U.S. 
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 179. Cf. id. at 353 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“In my view we should simply 
abandon the Belton-Thornton charade of officer safety and overrule those 
cases.”).  
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 181. See id. at 354. As Justice Scalia explained: “I am therefore confronted 
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those cases adopted by Justice Stevens.” Id. Because failing to limit Belton and 
Thornton represented the “greater evil,” Justice Scalia joined the majority. Id. 
 182. See id. at 358 (Alito, J., dissenting).  




exigency existed at the time of the arrest to, instead, on whether 
exigency remained present at the time of the search.183 
Additionally, Justice Alito’s criticism seemed to be directed at the 
majority’s failure to finish the job, arguing that it made no sense to 
fundamentally alter Belton without also reconsidering Chimel, the 
case on which Belton relied—because Belton had taken its 
“timing” benchmark from Chimel.184 By not reexamining Chimel, 
Justice Alito argued that Gant “leaves the law relating to searches 
incident to arrest in a confused and unstable state.”185 
III. RILEY’S IMPACT: BEYOND THE CELL PHONE CONTEXT 
Few areas of the law have been as subject to shifting 
constitutional standards over the last 50 years as that of the 
search “incident to an arrest.” There has been a remarkable 
instability in this whole area, which has seen at least four 
major shifts in emphasis. . . . [R]apid reversals have 
occurred before, but they are rare.186 
Riley is deceptive. On the one hand, Riley’s categorical protection 
of cell phone data has been enthusiastically received.187 And, the fact 
that Riley was one of the modern Court’s rare unanimous decisions 
might suggest that Riley’s only potential controversy involves the 
decision’s likely impact on law enforcement.188 But Riley’s narrow 
view of what constitutes search-incident precedent is telling.189 Riley 
represents more than a common sense cell phone privacy decision. 
Instead, Riley is a digital age reboot, reorganizing the search-incident 
doctrine into a singular Chimel-based rule that turns out to have a 
vehicle exception. 
A. The Doctrinal Implications of Reconfiguring Gant 
The Riley Court treated Gant as if it were nothing more than a 
limited evidence-gathering exception to the Fourth Amendment’s 
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warrant requirement—an exception that had nothing to do with 
Chimel.190 Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, Gant 
created a hybrid incident search—a search that was justified by 
evidence gathering, yet was limited in scope by Chimel’s arrest-
related exigency concerns191—consistent with other incident 
searches that the Court upheld in the early years after Chimel was 
decided.192 The hybrid nature of Gant’s evidence-gathering search was 
fully revealed in Gant’s explanation that, under its evidence-gathering 
holding, law enforcement could search “the passenger compartment of 
an arrestee’s vehicle and any containers therein”193—a limitation that 
Riley retained.194 Therefore, ironically enough, Riley endorsed a 
Chimel-based limitation—the passenger compartment of the arrestee’s 
vehicle—while also deciding that Gant’s evidence-gathering search 
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arrest” (emphasis added)); id. at 346 (same); id. at 343 (describing evidence-
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contains relevant evidence” (emphasis added)). However, Riley ignored this 
potentially inconsistent authority in concluding that Gant imposed a passenger-
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was an “independent” exception—an exception that Riley 
seemingly separated from the search-incident doctrine itself.195  
From a practical perspective, Riley’s apparent disconnection of 
Gant from the search-incident doctrine injects problematic 
instability into Gant’s evidence-gathering search. If Gant’s 
evidence-gathering search is truly independent of Chimel, then 
several questions flow from that vision of Gant. Left unresolved by 
Riley is whether an arresting officer who performs an evidence-
gathering vehicle search under Gant should be permitted to search 
every item in the passenger compartment of the arrestee’s vehicle 
(a la Belton),196 as opposed to searching only those items in the 
passenger compartment for which the officer has a legitimate basis 
to believe might contain evidence of the crime of arrest. In other 
words, when Gant’s evidence-gathering search is paired with 
Belton’s generalized scope rules, the resulting search of the 
vehicle’s passenger compartment might be more probing than what 
is supportable on the basis of suspicion alone.197 
 On the other hand, the scope of Gant’s hybrid vehicle search 
will sometimes be too narrow—since a legitimate basis to search 
for evidence of the crime of arrest (as contrasted with a Chimel-
based search to look for weapons or destructible evidence) might, 
in an appropriate case, also extend to the vehicle’s trunk.198 As 
Justice Alito argued in his Gant dissent, a passenger-compartment 
limitation simply had no relevancy to an evidence-gathering search 
of a vehicle: 
Nor is it easy to see why an evidence-gathering search 
incident to arrest should be restricted to the passenger 
compartment. The Belton rule was limited in this way 
because the passenger compartment was considered to be 
the area that vehicle occupants can generally reach, but 
since the second part of the new rule is not based on officer 
safety or the preservation of evidence, the ground for this 
limitation is obscure.199  
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Apparently not satisfied with leaving the origin of Gant’s 
evidence-gathering vehicle search “obscure,”200 Riley instead 
disconnected Gant’s two searches altogether—and did so on the basis 
of nothing more than the Court’s own rhetoric.201 Certainly, a 
passenger-compartment limitation was not what Justice Scalia had in 
mind in his Thornton concurrence.202 There, Justice Scalia explained 
that an evidence-gathering incident search of a vehicle was justifiable 
if “the car might contain evidence relevant to the crime for which [the 
arrestee] was arrested.”203 The standard for such a search, Justice 
Scalia posited, was “reason[] to believe evidence relevant to the crime 
of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”204 Further, Justice Scalia’s 
Thornton concurrence supported evidence gathering as a justification 
for incident searches based upon the lawfulness of the arrest,205 
without reference to the passenger-compartment limitation that Riley 
expressly embraced.206 As Justice Scalia explained in Thornton: 
There is nothing irrational about broader police authority to 
search for evidence when and where the perpetrator of a 
crime is lawfully arrested. The fact of prior lawful arrest 
distinguishes the arrestee from society at large, and 
distinguishes a search for evidence of his crime from general 
rummaging. Moreover, it is not illogical to assume that 
evidence of a crime is most likely to be found where the 
suspect was apprehended.207 
Nothing about Justice Scalia’s Thornton concurrence suggests that 
he favored limiting an evidence-gathering incident search of an 
arrestee’s vehicle to the vehicle’s passenger compartment. Yet, Gant 
seemingly imposed a definitional outer boundary—the vehicle’s 
passenger compartment—on its evidence-gathering search of a vehicle 
incident to an arrest of the vehicle’s occupant.208 In describing its 
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evidence-gathering search, Gant first endorsed the search that Justice 
Scalia advocated in Thornton but then recast it by distinguishing it 
from probable cause-based searches of vehicles.209 
Because Gant distinguished its evidence-gathering search from a 
search performed under the automobile exception,210 it is surprising 
indeed that Riley uncritically lumped those two searches together in its 
now-expanded view of the automobile exception.211 Riley’s 
reconfiguration of Gant was not required to impose a warrant 
requirement on cell phone searches. The sui generis nature of 
electronic devices—based on their vast capability for storing personal 
information and the absence of danger to law enforcement—was a 
sufficient basis for treating cellular phones differently from 
conventional containers.212 Considering the Court’s repeated course 
changes in interpreting the search-incident doctrine,213 the Riley 
Court’s willingness to embroider this volatile warrant exception is 
risky. Going forward, pretending that Gant’s two searches do not both 
arise from the search-incident doctrine will mean, at the very least, that 
the Chimel-based limitations on Gant’s evidence-gathering search are 
vulnerable.  
B. Restricting Gant’s Evidence-Gathering Search to Vehicles 
Riley concluded that Gant’s evidence-gathering search was 
limited to incident searches of vehicles—and only vehicles.214 As 
Riley explained, “Gant relied on circumstances unique to the 
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vehicle context to endorse a search solely for the purpose of 
gathering evidence.”215 Importantly, however, although Riley 
limited Gant’s evidence-gathering holding to vehicle searches, 
Riley was silent as to whether Gant’s first holding—Gant’s 
limitation of Belton—was applicable in non-vehicular cases.216 
After Gant, courts have increasingly been asked to do that very 
thing—to prohibit Chimel searches of the reaching distance of a 
pedestrian-arrestee or a person arrested at home, once that arrestee 
has been secured.217 This argument certainly comes as no surprise 
to Justice Alito. As he predicted in his Gant dissent, there was 
simply “no logical reason” why Gant’s Belton-limitation—which 
bars police from performing an incident search once the arrestee is 
adequately secured—“should not [also] apply to all arrestees.”218 
And Riley will only increase this argument’s momentum. In 
concluding that Chimel’s two concerns were not legitimately 
present in cell phone searches,219 Riley itself extended Gant’s 
Belton-limiting reasoning to a non-vehicular context.  
 For those who value Chimel, limiting Gant’s evidence-
gathering search to incident searches of vehicles, as Riley has 
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done,220 will, ironically enough, produce irreparable harm to 
Chimel. To explain, if Gant and Riley’s reasoning—that incident 
searches are not available unless Chimel’s concerns are 
legitimately present—is extended to all arrestees, police could be 
required to justify, on a case-by-case basis, performing a Chimel 
search of an arrestee’s reaching distance once the arrestee is 
secured. And, in evaluating reaching-distance searches, courts will 
no doubt be asked to accept law enforcement’s extravagant 
assessments of the danger posed by handcuffed arrestees, even 
those surrounded by several officers—all in an attempt to satisfy 
Chimel’s twin rationales.221  
Practical problems will also result. If courts are required to 
ignore evidence gathering as an implicit motivation for a properly 
limited incident search—in favor of Chimel’s (and only Chimel’s) 
twin rationales—police might be tempted to create an exigency 
basis to search an arrestee’s reaching distance by omitting security 
precautions that police would otherwise ordinarily take at an arrest 
scene.222 Additionally, extending Gant’s limitation of Belton to 
non-vehicular cases will necessitate a case-by-case determination 
of whether arrest-related exigency remained present at the time of 
the search, not arrest223—a significant departure from the rules-
oriented analysis that is this warrant exception’s primary selling 
point.224 If arrest-related exigency under Chimel dissipates (even in 
non-vehicular cases) once an arrestee is adequately secured, law 
enforcement could be required to obtain a warrant to search the 
arrestee’s reaching distance or the items found therein—even if the 
search was both properly limited under Chimel and legitimately 
directed at uncovering evidence of the crime of arrest.225  
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Instead, courts should harmonize the search-incident doctrine’s 
historical evidence-gathering basis with Chimel’s bright-line rules 
establishing the search’s scope in all incident searches,226 not just 
vehicle searches incident to arrest under Gant. And, by recognizing 
evidence gathering of the crime of arrest as a legitimate basis in 
most cases to perform a properly limited Chimel search of an 
arrestee’s reaching distance, courts can avoid what will otherwise 
be a debate about: (1) How secure is “secured”?; and (2) Did the 
arresting officer omit adequate security precautions in order to 
justify performing a Chimel search? Recognizing evidence 
gathering as an implicit search-incident motivation will prevent 
Chimel’s generalized rules from being “stretch[ed] . . . beyond 
[their] breaking point.”227  
C. Procurement of Evidence: A Condition Precedent to 
Preservation 
One of Chimel’s twin concerns was based on the need for law 
enforcement to find and seize “any evidence on the arrestee’s 
person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.”228 Yet, 
to preserve evidence from destruction, the arresting officer must 
first find the evidence and remove it from the arrestee’s control: 
procurement. In his Riley concurrence, Justice Alito recognized 
that an obvious condition precedent to preservation is removal of 
evidence from the arrestee’s possession or control, thus eliminating 
the risk of destruction.229  
Although Justice Alito did more in Riley than Justice Scalia, 
for example, to protect evidence gathering as a justification for 
incident searches,230 Justice Alito’s concurrence could be clarified 
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to recognize the dual nature of the term, “preservation.” Justice 
Alito argued that officer safety and “evidence preservation” did not 
fully explain the justifications for the search-incident doctrine.231 
To expand on Justice Alito’s thoughts, “preservation” encompasses 
more than simply preventing the concealment or destruction of 
evidence. The term necessarily encompasses procurement of 
evidence (the first half of the act of “preserving”) as well as 
preventing the destruction or concealment of evidence (the second 
half of the act of “preserving”). After all, one cannot preserve what 
one has not procured.  
Interestingly, an older cell phone case that upheld a warrantless 
cell phone search—of course, decided before Riley—contains an 
apt discussion of preservation. In United States v. Finley, law 
enforcement established a pre-Riley legitimate basis to search 
Finley’s cellular phone for evidence of the crime of arrest—
conspiracy to sell methamphetamine.232 Upon his arrest, Finley 
told the investigating agents that Brown, the other arrestee, had 
called him to request a ride to the truck stop in order for Brown to 
purchase cigarettes. Finley claimed, however, that he knew nothing 
of Brown’s plan to sell drugs at the truck stop.233 Because Finley 
told the agents that he and Brown had communicated by phone to 
set up the ride to the truck stop, law enforcement had a legitimate 
basis—prior to Riley—to search Finley’s phone because there was 
reason to believe that evidence of the drug conspiracy might be 
found in the phone’s call log and text messages.  
“Preservation,” as the term was used in Finley,234 suggested a 
broader basis to search than would be supportable under Riley’s 
rigid interpretation of Chimel’s “destructibility” concern.235 For the 
Fifth Circuit, “preservation” arguably meant nothing more than 
that law enforcement had “obtained” or “secured” the cell phone 
evidence for its eventual use at trial. In so saying, Finley clearly 
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assumed that an evidence-gathering basis to search incident to 
arrest existed if the scope of that search was otherwise proper 
under the search-incident exception.236 Although Finley framed its 
analysis in terms of Chimel-based cases, Finley was, in reality, a 
limited evidence-gathering search incident to arrest. 
The point of harmonizing Justice Alito’s concurrence and 
Finley’s interpretation of “preservation” is that an evidence-
gathering rationale—in a properly limited search incident to 
arrest—exists independently of Chimel even though there is 
generally a confluence between the two concepts. Although 
Chimel is concerned with what an arrestee might do—injure an 
officer or destroy evidence—evidence gathering is concerned with 
what an officer might do: obtain probative evidence of the crime of 
arrest that could aid in the arrestee’s conviction. The confluence 
exists by virtue of the manner in which the evidence is obtained—
in response to an arrestee’s actions or in furtherance of a 
conviction.  
The fact that evidence gathering existed nearly 200 years 
before Chimel as a basis for a search incident to arrest lends further 
support to the notion that preservation first requires procurement. 
In other words, the search-incident doctrine has a tripartite basis: 
evidence gathering of the crime of arrest, officer safety, and 
preventing the destruction of evidence. Or, in short hand: procure, 
protect, and prevent. It just so happens that “preservation” in most 
cases encompasses both procurement and prevention—even 
though procurement has a historical pedigree that substantially 
antedates Chimel’s “prevention” annex to the search-incident 
doctrine. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The idea that officer safety and the preservation of 
evidence are the sole reasons for allowing a warrantless 
search incident to arrest appears to derive from the Court’s 
reasoning in Chimel v. California . . . . As I have explained, 
Chimel’s reasoning is questionable, and I think it is a 
mistake to allow that reasoning to affect cases like these 
that concern the search of the person of arrestees.237 
When Chimel was decided in 1969, the decision was seen as 
the cure for an unresolvable judicial ailment: establishing physical 
boundaries for premises searches incident to arrest. In Chimel and 
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the cases that generalized Chimel, the Court articulated bright-line 
search-incident rules that, although relying on Chimel’s twin 
concerns, never excluded evidence gathering as a legitimate 
motivation to search within an otherwise properly limited search 
incident to arrest. Riley v. California’s warrant requirement for cell 
phone searches resolved a number of problematic legal issues that 
had arisen in applying the Court’s bright-line search-incident 
doctrine to a new technological device—cellular phones—searches 
that raised privacy concerns on a scale previously unknown in the 
pre-digital age.238 Yet, just because Riley addressed a digital age 
problem does not mean that the Riley Court had carte blanche to 
ignore pre-digital age doctrine. 
Although Riley appears to be a straightforward holding—
cellular phones contain vast quantities of private information that 
cannot be searched incident to arrest absent a warrant—the path 
Riley blazed in reaching this outcome represents an important 
retcon of the search-incident doctrine. The “strife of Riley,” as 
suggested in this Article’s title, is that the Riley Court reshaped the 
search-incident doctrine, molding it into a Chimel-based rule that 
just so happens to have a vehicle exception.239 Riley treated Gant 
as an outlier—an exception on wheels. Never mind that one of the 
driving forces behind Gant was Justice Scalia’s concurrence in 
Thornton v. United States240—a concurrence that relied on the 
search-incident doctrine’s historical basis as an evidence-gathering 
search, not a simple elaboration on the automobile exception. After 
Riley, evidence gathering seems to have been left in the dust— 
nothing more than a pit stop on the highway to a search-incident 
doctrine that is now based exclusively on officer safety and 
preventing the destruction of evidence. Only Justice Alito 
recognized the Riley Court’s error in excluding evidence gathering 
as a legitimate rationale in a properly limited search incident to 
arrest. And, judging from the ancient history of the search-incident 
doctrine and the consequences that Riley’s most recent doctrinal 
reorganization will have, Justice Alito was right. 
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